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DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE GUIDELINESDuke University Professor E. Allan Lind researched the most common reasons an employee sues his former employer. Of course, these include wanting to make quick money to cure financial hardship. But what impels employees to sue most frequently is perceived lack of "fairness"--how they were treated when they were employed, and how they were treated when they got fired. Experience shows that when a case gets to court, a jury is more concerned about fairness than they are about the facts or law. An employer may have the facts and law in its favor, but if an employer's treatment of its employee "does not seem fair," the employer will lose. How can an employer make sure that its actions are perceived by an outsider to be "fair"? Each employer should prepare and follow discipline review procedures. These may be prepared by committee (which could include the human resources director, legal counsel, and others), but they should be administered by one person. Only in this manner can the employer be confident that one employee's discipline is neither worse nor better than another's. The following are important issues to be considered.
Observation. Any discipline/discharge case involves managing risks. The foregoing issues, if properly addressed, will result in better risk management, and therefore less exposure in court. Mark M. Lawson Back To The TopRECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS MAKE THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES ESSENTIALTwo recent Supreme Court decisions make the creation and dissemination of a comprehensive sexual harassment policy more important than ever. In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court expanded the basis for employer liability as a result of the harassing conduct of supervisors. Luckily for employers though, the Supreme Court also spelled out a way that employers can avoid liability for this often hard to detect harassment. Under earlier law, the courts considered whether the sex harassment claim was one of quid pro quo harassment, or one that involved "hostile work environment." Harassment was considered quid pro quo when an employee's terms and conditions of employment were changed in retaliation for the spurned advances of a supervisor. An employer could be held vicariously liable for such harassment even if they never knew, nor should have known, that the harassment was occurring. On the other hand, an employer might not be held vicariously liable for harassment creating a "hostile work environment," unless the employer, after notice, had not taken steps to prevent and correct the harassment. Ellerth and Faragher created new law. In those cases, the Supreme Court said that an employer can be vicariously liable for a supervisor's conduct even if the employer knew nothing about the supervisor's actions. If the harassment culminates in a "tangible employment action," such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment, the employer is liable and has no defense. On the other hand, if the supervisor takes no adverse employment action against the employee but creates a "hostile environment," the employer is still presumed to be vicariously liable, but may escape liability if it can prove that it has effectively promulgated and administered an anti-harassment policy. To effectively utilize this defense, the burden of proof is on the employer to prove (a) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense. So what should an employer do? At a minimum, draft a clear, reasonably user friendly, comprehensive anti-harassment policy; indoctrinate all employees, and document their receipt of the policy; train employees periodically about sexual harassment--how to prevent and report it, and document their training; and provide sexual harassment prevention training to all supervisors and managers on an annual basis, and review company policies and practices with the supervisors to ensure uniform implementation. An employer should respond to each harassment complaint with a thorough, complete, and well-documented investigation, followed by a prompt and reasonable response. Utilization of these measures, and documentation of their implementation, may greatly increase success in defending any harassment claim. Eric W. Reecher Back To The TopTITLE VII'S BATTLE OF THE DAYSIn Virginia a battle has been waging on whether a claimant must file his charge under Title VII within 180 days or the more generous 300 days. And the winner is . . . well, it depends on which Fourth Circuit panel one asks. In June, one panel, in an unreported case, found the answer to be 180 days. While in September, a second panel, declared the answer to be 300 days. The crux of the issue is whether the Virginia Human Rights Counsel is a deferral agency. A deferral agency is defined as a state agency that has the authority to either: (1) grant relief from an unlawful employment practice; (2) seek relief from an unlawful employment practice; or (3) institute criminal proceedings with respect to the practice. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70. On this issue, the EEOC answered yes, the Virginia Human Rights Counsel is a deferral agency; while the Western District of Virginia answered no. This conflict of opinions led the question to the Fourth Circuit. In June, it looked like the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Western District of Virginia and found the Counsel was not a deferral agency. Childress v. Appalachian Power Company, 1998 WL 417278 (4th Cir.). However, this decision was not reported; therefore, it did not carry the full force of binding law. While from the Childress decision it appeared that the answer from the Fourth Circuit on this issue was a claimant must file within 180 days; however, in September a second panel readdressed the issue. This time the Fourth Circuit found that the Virginia Human Rights Counsel was a deferral agency. This panel determined that the Counsel had the power to "seek relief" under Title VII, because it could investigate a claim, attempt conciliation, and seek relief through other state agencies. Tinsley v. First Union National Bank, 1998 WL 557166 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, while it first appeared that a claimant had only 180 days to file, it now appears a claimant shall have the more generous time period of 300 days to file his charge with the EEOC. Kristine Kring Back To The TopPUNITIVE DAMAGES LIMITED UNDER THE TENNESSEE HUMAN RIGHTS ACTISSUE Whether punitive damages are allowed under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA")? SUPREME COURT HOLDING Punitive damages are available under the THRA only for claims involving discriminatory housing practices and malicious harassment. Carver v. Citizens Utility Co. d/b/a Citizens Telecommunications Co. of Tennessee, 954 S.W.2d 34 (1997). BACKGROUND Plaintiffs claimed age discrimination by employer Defendant which violated the THRA. Plaintiffs then claimed entitlement to punitive damages under THRA. Before start of trial, the district court certified the question to the Tennessee Supreme Court on whether punitive damages were allowed under the THRA. THE DECISION The Court decided this question purely as a matter of statutory construction. The relative statute involved was Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-21-101 to 905 (THRA), and more specifically, sections 4-21-306 & 311. Section 4-21-306(8) seemed to implicitly allow punitive damages in employment discrimination cases under the "necessary and proper" language. While section 4-21-311(c) explicitly allowed punitive damages in cases involving discriminatory housing practices. The Court construing the statute as a whole ("in para materia") decided that by explicitly providing for punitive damages in one section that it thereby prohibits punitive damages in a catch-all remedy provision. Thus, punitive damages are allowed for claims involving discriminatory housing practices, but not in employment discrimination cases. In addition to the discriminatory housing exception, section 4-21-701 states that "malicious harassment" is unlawful under THRA. This section specifically allows for punitive damages, thereby, carving out a second exception which explicitly allows for punitive damages under the THRA. RESULT This decision is a victory for Tennessee employers, because under THRA act punitive damages can only be awarded in the two specific instances of discriminatory housing practices and malicious harassment. So while an employer may still be liable for "humiliation and embarrassment" suffered by a plaintiff, it cannot be hit twice by the addition of punitive damages in an employment discrimination case. However an employer may now be faced with an increase in malicious harassment charges under section 4-21-701, in plaintiffs' attempts to receive punitive damages. Kristine Kring ![]()
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